Iran entered a critical moment on Tuesday, 30 December, as protests that began in Tehran’s historic Grand Bazaar entered their third day and expanded into a nationwide confrontation with the ruling clerical establishment. What started as a strike by merchants over the collapse of the national currency and crushing inflation has rapidly evolved into an openly political uprising, with chants demanding the overthrow of the regime echoing through central Tehran and beyond.
The participation of bazaar traders, students, workers, and pensioners underscores that this unrest is not a temporary outburst but a manifestation of a deep structural rupture between Iranian society and the state. The convergence of these social groups—long considered pillars of stability—signals a crisis that cuts across class and generational lines.
One of the most revealing developments has come not from opposition sources, but from regime-aligned media itself. In a report published on 29 December, Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, admitted that protests in central Tehran were not limited to economic grievances. According to the report, eyewitnesses described crowds of around 200 people that included organised groups of five to ten individuals chanting explicitly political slogans.
This admission marks a notable departure from the regime’s long-standing narrative that protests are spontaneous, leaderless, or driven by vague foreign manipulation. Instead, Fars implicitly acknowledged a structured and purposeful element within the demonstrations. The described pattern closely resembles the decentralised mobilisation tactics used by the (PMOI) and its Resistance Units, which operate through small, coordinated cells to sustain and politicise popular unrest.
Even more striking, Fars explicitly named Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The agency reported that she had called for the “formation of a chain of protests,” citing intelligence sources who framed this appeal as an effort to turn economic grievances into political instability. In doing so, regime media effectively confirmed that Tehran views the PMOI and its network as a central catalyst in transforming social discontent into organised anti-regime mobilisation.
The unrest has now moved decisively beyond the bazaar. Over the past 48 hours, protests have erupted in major universities and student dormitories in Tehran, including University of Tehran, long regarded as a political bellwether. Students have chanted slogans such as “Students would rather die than be humiliated” and “Fear us, fear us, we are all together,” prompting security forces to surround campuses and seal off dormitories to prevent public support.
In response, authorities have adopted preventative measures rather than overt violence. Universities have been ordered closed from Wednesday through the weekend, a move widely seen as an attempt to break protest momentum and prevent coordination between students and striking merchants. This administrative shutdown echoes tactics used during previous uprisings.
Meanwhile, Iran’s economic collapse continues unabated. The rial has plunged to historic lows, with the US dollar exceeding 140,000 tomans. Major commercial hubs in Tehran—including Alaeddin and Charsou complexes, Lalehzar Street, and large sections of the Grand Bazaar—remain shuttered. Similar strikes and protests have been reported in Mashhad, Karaj, Kermanshah, Hamedan, Malard, and Qeshm, highlighting the national scope of the unrest.
Security forces have so far exercised calibrated restraint, avoiding mass killings. This caution reflects regime anxiety: officials appear to understand that excessive violence at this stage could rapidly radicalise public anger and broaden the uprising.
As the bazaar and universities increasingly converge as centres of resistance, Iran appears to be entering a phase in which organised opposition and popular anger are aligning—posing a sustained and potentially transformative challenge to the foundations of clerical rule.