By John Bercow: The death of Ali Khamenei has not triggered the immediate collapse of the Islamic Republic that some observers predicted. Instead, it has exposed a regime struggling to sustain itself amid mounting internal pressure and political uncertainty.
Within days of Khamenei’s death, Iran’s Assembly of Experts elevated his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to the role of Supreme Leader. The move marked the first effective father-to-son transfer of power since the Iranian Revolution that originally ended Iran’s monarchy.
Rather than signaling strength, the decision appears to reflect the regime’s limited options. Mojtaba Khamenei carries the powerful legacy of his father’s name and maintains ties to influential institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Yet he lacks the political authority and experience that defined his father’s leadership.
The leadership’s priority in choosing Mojtaba seems clear: maintain unity during a period of instability and prevent further unrest. Iran has already faced waves of protest in recent years, including a major uprising in early 2026. Authorities fear that another nationwide movement could emerge—one potentially larger and more intense than previous demonstrations.
For many Iranians, the appointment reinforces a troubling perception. A system that once defined itself as revolutionary now appears increasingly hereditary. The Islamic Republic risks being viewed less as a republic and more as a closed political order maintained by loyalty networks rather than public legitimacy.
This reality raises a critical question: if the current system remains intact, where might meaningful change come from?
Some commentators have turned their attention to figures outside Iran, particularly Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former monarch. Supporters argue that Pahlavi could unite opposition forces and provide a recognizable alternative to clerical rule.
However, political legitimacy cannot rest solely on family heritage or international visibility. Iran’s monarchy was overthrown precisely because many citizens rejected hereditary authority, repression, and corruption associated with the former regime. Simply replacing one dynastic structure with another would likely fail to address the demands of millions of Iranians who seek democratic representation.
Protest movements inside the country have repeatedly voiced this sentiment. Demonstrators have chanted slogans rejecting both the ruling clerics and the return of the monarchy, signaling a desire for a fundamentally new political system rather than a revival of old power structures.
Some analysts therefore point to organized opposition movements that have maintained long-term political activity. One such group is the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), claims decades of activism against the current regime.
Led by Maryam Rajavi, the NCRI promotes a platform built around democratic governance. Rajavi’s widely publicized ten-point plan proposes universal suffrage, free elections, separation of religion and state, gender equality, abolition of the death penalty, and a non-nuclear Iran.
Supporters argue that such a structured program provides a roadmap for political transition. Whether it can gain widespread support inside Iran remains uncertain, but the proposal highlights a broader truth: lasting change rarely comes from spontaneous upheaval alone. Successful transitions typically require organized movements with clear plans for governance.
Iran now faces a decisive moment. Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership could stabilize the current system temporarily, or it could deepen internal tensions and accelerate calls for reform. Ultimately, the country’s future may depend on whether a credible democratic alternative can emerge—one capable of moving beyond both clerical rule and dynastic power.
John Bercow served as Speaker of the House of Commons from 2009 to 2019.